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Abstract—Deep generative models have recently achieved im-
pressive results for many real-world applications, successfully
generating high-resolution and diverse samples from complex
data sets. Due to this improvement, fake digital contents have
proliferated growing concern and spreading distrust in image
content, leading to an urgent need for automated ways to detect
these AI-generated fake images.
Despite the fact that many face editing algorithms seem
to produce realistic human faces, upon closer examination,
they do exhibit artifacts in certain domains which are often
hidden to the naked eye. In this work, we present a simple
way to detect such fake face images - so-called DeepFakes.
Our method is based on a classical frequency domain analysis
followed by a basic classifier. Compared to previous systems,
which need to be fed with large amounts of labeled data,
our approach showed very good results using only a few
annotated training samples and even achieved good accuracies
in fully unsupervised scenarios. For the evaluation on high
resolution face images, we combined several public data sets
of real and fake faces into a new benchmark: Faces-HQ.
Given such high-resolution images, our approach reaches a
perfect classification accuracy of 100% when it is trained on
as little as 20 annotated samples. In a second experiment, in
the evaluation of the medium-resolution images of the CelebA
data set, our method achieves 100% accuracy supervised
and 96% in an unsupervised setting. Finally, evaluating a
low-resolution video sequences of the FaceForensics++ data set,
our method achieves 91% accuracy detecting manipulated videos.
Source Code: https://github.com/cc-hpc-itwm/DeepFakeDetection
Index Terms—GAN images, DeepFake, Image forensic, Forgery
detection
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last years, the increasing sophistication of smart-
phones and the growth of social networks have led to a gigantic
amount of new digital object contents. This tremendous use
of digital images has been followed by a rise of techniques
to alter image contents. Until recently, such techniques were
beyond the reach of most users since they were dull and
time-consuming and they required a high domain expertise on
computer vision. Nevertheless, thanks to the recent advances
of machine learning and the accessibility to large-volume
training data, those limitations have gradually faded away.
As a consequence, the time for fabrication and manipulation
of digital contents has significantly decreased, allowing even
amateur users the modification of contents at their will.
Fig. 1: 1D power spectrum statistics from each sub-data set
from Faces-HQ. The higher the frequency, the bigger is the
difference between real or fake data.
In particular, deep generative models have lately been
extensively used to produce artificial images with realistic
appearance. Theses models are based on deep neural networks
which are able to approximate the true data distribution of a
given training set. Hence, one can sample from the learned
distribution and add variations. Two of the most commonly
used and efficient approaches are Variational Autoencoders
(VAE) [16] and Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) [11].
Especially GAN approaches have lately been pushing the
limits of state-of-the-art results, improving the resolution and
quality of images produced [4], [14], [15]. As a result, deep
generative models are opening the door to a new vein of AI-
based fake image generation leading to a fast dissemination
of high quality tampered image content. While significant
developments have been made for image forgery detection,
it still remains a hard task since most current methods rely
on deep learning approaches, which require large amounts of
labeled training data.
In this paper, we address the problem of detecting these
artificial image contents, more specifically, fake faces. In order
to determine the nature of these pictures, we introduce a new
machine learning based method. Our approach relies on a
classical frequency analysis of the images that reveals different
behaviors at high frequencies. Fig. 1 shows how different
a certain range of frequency components behave when the
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Fig. 2: Overview of the processing pipeline of our approach. It contains two main blocks, a feature extraction block using
DFT and a training block, where a classifier uses the new transformed features to determine whether the face is real or not.
Notice that input images are transformed to grey-scale before DFT.
images have been artificially generated.
Our method detects such artifacts by analyzing the
frequency domain followed by a simple supervised or
unsupervised classifier. Notice that this suggested pipeline
does not involve nor requires vast quantities of data, which
is a very convenient property for those scenarios that suffer
from data scarcity. In addition, we introduce a new data set
Faces-HQ, which we used to complement the CelebA data
set and FaceForensics++ data set [25], for our experimental
evaluation.
Overall, our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We introduce a novel classification pipeline for artificial
face detection based on a frequency domain analysis.
• We provide a public data set (Faces-HQ) of high quality
images containing real and fake faces from a set of
different public databases.
• We demonstrate how we successfully learn to detect
forgery: extensive experiments on high and medium-
resolution images of the Faces-HQ and CelebA data sets
showed 100% accuracy. Additionally, the evaluation of
the FaceForensics++ data set with low-resolution videos
reached 91% accuracy.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly review the related seminal work
on high-resolution artificial images forensics and deepfake
images, as well as forgery detection. In particular, we focus
our attention on spotting tampered images generated by GAN-
based methods.
Traditional image forensics methods can be classified ac-
cording to the image features that they target, such as local
noise estimation [23], pattern analysis [10], illumination mod-
eling [9] and steganalysis feature classification [7]. However,
with the deep learning breakthrough, the computer vision
community has radically steered towards neural networks
techniques. For example, [8], [28] are recent works based
on Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). These CNN-based
approaches also aim to capture the aforementioned image
features, but in an inexplicit way.
In 2014, Goodfellow et al. introduced an adversarial frame-
work (GAN) which marked a milestone in generative mod-
els. In particular, the image generation has been improved
significantly, leading to a striking progress on artificial faces
[5] among others. As a consequence, new image and video
manipulation techniques known as DeepFake have emerged
and established themselves online over the last few months.
This occurrence of events on digital image forensics has been
drawing an ever increasing attention trying to detect GAN
generated images or videos.
The lack of eye blinking [18] is one drawback observed,
when the videos are artificially created. This is due to the
scarcity of training images including photographs with the
subject’s eyes closed. Nevertheless, this detection can be
circumvented by adding images with closed eyes in training.
Finding unnatural head poses, is also an extend technique [26],
in order to detect tampered digital contents. On the other hand,
the works [17], [22] analyze the color-space features from
GAN generated images and real images, and use the disparity
to classify them.
Other approaches [2], [21], [27], rather than leveraging
explicit lacks or failures, rely on CNNs to distinguish GAN’s
output from real images. In the same vein, [13] introduces
deep forgery discriminator with a contrastive loss function
and [12] incorporates temporal domain information by
employing Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) upon CNNs.
While deep learning methods show promising performance,
a key concern is that all these methods can be easily learnt
by the GAN. In particular, by incorporating them in to the
GAN’s discriminator, the generator can be fine-tuned to learn
a countermeasure for any differentiable forensic.
III. METHOD
In the following section, we describe our approach in
detail. Figure 2) gives an overview of the processing steps.
A. Frequency Domain Analysis
Frequency domain analysis is of utmost importance in
signal processing theory and applications. In particular in the
computer vision domain, the repetitive nature or the frequency
Fig. 3: Example of a DFT applied to a sample. (Left) Input
image 1. (Center) Power Spectrum. (Right) Phase Spectrum.
characteristics of images can be analyzed on a space defined
by Fourier transform. Such transformation consists in a
spectral decomposition of the input data indicating how the
signal’s energy is distributed over a range of frequencies.
Methods based on frequency domain analysis have shown
wide applications in image processing, such as image analysis,
image filtering, image reconstruction and image compression.
1) Discrete Fourier Transform: The Discrete Fourier Trans-
form (DFT) is a mathematical technique to decompose a dis-
crete signal into sinusoidal components of various frequencies
ranging from 0 (i.e., constant frequency, corresponding to the
image mean value) up to the maximum representable fre-
quency, given the spatial resolution. It is the discrete analogon
of the continuous Fourier Transform for signals sampled on
equidistant points. For 2-dimensional data of size M ×N , it
can be computed as
Xk,` =
N−1∑
n=0
M−1∑
0
xn,m · e− i2piN kn · e− i2piM `m. (1)
The frequency-domain representation of a signal (Xk)
carries information about the signal’s amplitude and phase at
each frequency. Fig. 3 depicts the complex output information
(power and phase). Notice that the amplitude spectrum is the
square root power spectrum.
2) Azimuthal Average: After applying a Fourier Transform
to a sample image, the information is represented in a new
domain but within the same dimensionality. Therefore, given
that we work with images, the output still contains 2D
information. We apply azimuthal averaging to compute a
robust 1D representation of the FFT power spectrum. It can
be seen as a compression, gathering and averaging similar
frequency components into a vector of features. In this way,
we can reduce the amount of features without losing relevant
information. Furthermore, throughout this compression, we
achieve a more robust representation of the input. Fig. 4
shows a visual example of such method.
B. Classifier Algorithms
Classification is the task to learn a general mapping from
the attribute space to descrete classes, using specific examples
1Notice that we convert the input image to gray-scale before applying FFT.
Fig. 4: Example of an azimuthal average. (Left) Power
Spectrum 2D. (Right) Power Spectrum 1D. Each frequency
component is the radial average from the 2D spectrum.
of instances, each represented by a vector of attribute values
and their acording lable.
1) Logistic Regression: One of the technically simplest
(linear) classification algorithms is the Logistic Regression
(LR). It is a simple statistical model that employs a logistic
function (see Formula (4)) to model a binary dependent
variable. The output from the hypothesis h is the estimated
probability. This is used to infer how confident predicted value
can be given an input x. Logistic regression is formulated as
hw(x) =
1
1 + e−wT x
(2)
The underlying algorithm of maximum likelihood
estimation determines the regression coefficient w for the
model that accurately predicts and fits the probability of the
binary dependent variable. The algorithm stops when the
convergence criterion is met or the maximum number of
iterations is reached.
2) Support Vector Machines: Support Vector Machines
(SVMs) [3], [6] are among the most widely used learning
algorithms for (non-linear) data classification. The target of the
SVM formulation is to produce a model (based on the training
data) which will identify an optimal separating hyperplane,
maximizing the margin between different classes. Given a
training set of instance-label pairs (xi, yi), i = 1, ..., l where
xi ∈ Rn and y ∈ {1,−1}l, Training of SVMs is implemented
by the solution of the following optimization problem
min
w,b,ξ
1
2
||w||2 + C
l∑
i=1
ξi
s.t. yi(wTφ(xi) + b) ≥ 1− ξi,
ξi ≥ 0,
(3)
where w and b are the parameters of our classifier, ξ is the
slack variable and C > 0 the penalty parameter of the error
term.
Here training vectors xi are mapped into a higher
dimensional space by the function φ. The training objective
of SVMs is to find a linear separating hyperplane with the
maximal margin in this higher dimensional space.
3) K-Means Clustering: While supervised classification
algorithms like SVM and LR rely on labeled training example
to learn a classification, we also want to test the detection
performance in the absence of any labeled data. Clustering
is an unsupervised machine learning technique which finds
similarities in the data points and group similar data points
together. The key assumption is that nearby points in the
feature space exhibit similar qualities and they can be clustered
together. Clustering can be done using different techniques like
K-means clustering.
The K-means objective function is defined as
J =
K∑
k=1
m∑
i=1
||xi − µk||2 (4)
where K and m are the number of clusters and samples
respectively.
A common approach to heuristically approximate solutions is
to iteratively identify nearby features based on the distances
calculated from initial centroids µ. Then, these features are
assigned to the closest cluster and the centroids are re-
estimated. Since the amount of clusters is determined by the
user, it can be easily employed in classification where we
divide data into K clusters with K equal to or greater than
the number of classes.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we show results for a series of experiments
evaluating the effectiveness of our approach. First, we intro-
duce a new high-resolution data set, called Faces-HQ, together
with its training settings and experiments, and we discuss our
results in detail. In order to verify our approach, we also
evaluate on the CelebA data set [19], which contains medium-
resolution images, and on the FaceForensics++ data set [25],
which contains low-resolution video sequences.
A. Faces-HQ
1) Data set: to the best of our knowledge, currently no
public data set is providing high resolution images with
annotated fake and real faces. Therefore, we have created our
own data set from established sources, called Faces-HQ2. In
order to have a sufficient variety of faces, we have chosen to
download and label the images available from the CelebA-HQ
data set [14], Flickr-Faces-HQ data set [15], 100K Faces
project [1] and www.thispersondoesnotexist.com. In total, we
have collected 40K high quality images, half of them real
and the other half fake faces. Table I contains a summary.
2Faces-HQ data has a size of 19GB. Download: https://cutt.ly/6enDLYG
# of samples category label
CelebA-HQ data set [14] 10000 Fake 0
Flickr-Faces-HQ data set [15] 10000 Fake 0
100K Faces project [1] 10000 Real 1
www.thispersondoesnotexist.com 10000 Real 1
TABLE I: Faces-HQ data set structure.
Fig. 5: T-SNE visualization of 1D Power Spectrum on a
random subset from Faces-HQ data set. We used a perplexity
of 4 and 4000 iterations to produce the plot.
2) Training Setting: as shown in Fig. 2, our pipeline is
split into two parts. On the one hand, at pre-processing
time, we take the whole data set and we transform every
sample from the spatial domain to the 1D frequency do-
main, reducing 1024x1024x3 high quality color images to
722 features (1D Power Spectrum). This method is formed
by a Discrete Fourier Transform followed by an azimuthally
average. The transformation can be substantially optimized
by employing the Fast Fourier Transform. Notice that after
applying the transformation, we use only the power spectrum
since it already contains enough information for the classifier.
A first visualization (see Fig. 5) using t-Distributed Stochastic
Neighbor Embedding [20] (t-SNE) reveals a clear clustering
of fake and real samples in this feature space.
On the other hand, once the pre-processing step is finished,
we start training the classifier engine. First of all, we divide
the transformed data into training and testing sets, with
20% for the testing stage and use the remaining 80% as the
training set. Then, we train a classifier with the training data
and finally evaluate the accuracy on the testing set. Our goal
is to distinguish, real and fake faces, thus we need to use a
binary classifier.
3) Method 1D Power Spectrum: looking at Fig. 6, one can
observe that there is a certain repetitive behavior or pattern on
the 1D Power Spectrum on those images that belong to the
same class. Just by checking individual samples, it is possible
to conclude that real and fake images behave in noticeable
different spectra at high frequencies, and therefore they can
be easily classified.
Driven by this phenomenon, we have evaluated a significant
(a) www.thispersondoesnotexist.com
(b) 100K Faces project.
(c) Flickr-Faces-HQ data set.
(d) CelebA-HQ data set.
Fig. 6: Samples from the different data sets gathered on Faces-HQ data set. It is possible to observe on the 1D Power Spectrum
some similitudes between images belonging to the same class and differences otherwise. For instance, real faces (c) and (d)
do not have flat regions at high frequencies, whereas fake (a) and (b) have them.
80% (train) - 20% (test)
# samples SVM Logistic Reg. K-Means
4000 100% 100% 77%
1000 100% 100% 77%
100 100% 100% 75%
20 100% 100% 72%
TABLE II: Test accuracy using SVM, logistic regression and
k-means classifier under different data settings.
subset of images (4000 in total, 1000 of each sub-data set)
and we have computed basic statistics to try to find a more
general representation that help to simplify the problem. Fig.
1 plots the mean and the standard deviation of each sub-data
set and corroborates the observable and distinguishable trend
that real and fake images have. Motivated by this observations
we have carried out a set of tests to determine the extent to
which our approach successfully detects deepfakes and how
much data is needed to train the model. In our experiments,
we have implemented one classifier based on support vector
machines (SVMs) with a radial basis function kernel and one
based on logistic regression. We have run an initial experiment
using 80% of the data for training and 20% for testing. We
have utilized this configuration for different amount of samples
(4000, 1000, 100, 20) equally distributed (see Table II).
PPPPPPfrom
to 100 200 300 400 500 600 722
0 58% 69% 85% 89% 98% 100% 100%
100 - 72% 86% 89% 98% 100% 100%
200 - - 85% 87% 99% 100% 100%
300 - - - 84% 98% 100% 100%
400 - - - - 93% 100% 100%
500 - - - - - 100% 100%
600 - - - - - - 100%
TABLE III: Test accuracy using SVM classifier.
After testing the effectiveness and efficiency of our trans-
formed features, we have conducted a another round of
experiments to determine the impact of different frequency
components. Given the 722 features from 1D Power Spectrum,
we have analyzed the relevance of different frequencies by
grouping them into 28 sub-sections. Table III,Table IV and
Table V show the accuracy results on SVM, logistic regression
and K-means respectively. The rows indicate where the chunk
PPPPPPfrom
to 100 200 300 400 500 600 722
0 58% 70% 86% 90% 98% 100% 100%
100 - 72% 88% 90% 98% 100% 100%
200 - - 86% 89% 99% 100% 100%
300 - - - 85% 98% 100% 100%
400 - - - - 92% 100% 100%
500 - - - - - 100% 100%
600 - - - - - - 99%
TABLE IV: Test accuracy using logistic regression classifier.
PPPPPPfrom
to 100 200 300 400 500 600 722
0 75% 75% 75% 72% 74% 74% 77%
100 - 75% 75% 74% 74% 74% 78%
200 - - 73% 72% 74% 74% 75%
300 - - - 72% 74% 76% 76%
400 - - - - 75% 77% 74%
500 - - - - - 80% 77%
600 - - - - - - 74%
TABLE V: Test accuracy using k-means classifier.
of frequencies starts, and the column where it ends. For
example, there is a chunk with 0.86 accuracy that contains
frequencies from 100 to 300.
B. CelebA
1) Data set: CelebFaces Attributes (CelebA) data set [19]
consists of 202,599 celebrity face images with 40 variations
in facial attributes. The dimensions of the face images
are 178x218x3, which can be considered to be a medium
resolution in our context.
2) Training Setting: In order to train our forgery detection
classifier we need both real and fake images. We used the real
images from the CelebA data set. On the same set, we then
train a DCGAN [24] to generate realistic but fake images. We
split the data set into 162,770 images for training and 39,829
for testing, and we crop and resize the initial 178x218x3 size
images to 128x128x3. Once the model is trained, we can
conduct the classification experiments on medium-resolution
scale.
3) Results: We follow the same procedure as in the pre-
vious experiments. Table VI) shows perfect classification
accuracy in the supervised, and also very good results in
unsupervised clustering.
80% (train) - 20% (test)
# samples SVM Logistic Reg. K-Means
2000 100% 100% 96%
TABLE VI: Test accuracy using SVM, logistic regression and
k-means classifier.
C. FaceForensics++
1) Data set: FaceForensics++ [25] is a forensics data set
consisting of video sequences that have been modified with
different automated face manipulation methods. Additionally,
(a) Example of one real face (left) and two deepfake faces, fake 1
(center) and fake 2 (right). Notice that the modifications only affect
the inner face.
(b) Normalized and interpolated 1D Power Spectrum from the pre-
vious images.
Fig. 7: Cropped samples from DeepFakeDetection data set and
their corresponding statistics.
it is hosting DeepFakeDetection Data set. In particular, this
data set contains 363 original sequences from 28 paid actors
in 16 different scenes as well as over 3000 manipulated
videos using DeepFakes and their corresponding binary
masks. All videos contain a trackable, mostly frontal face
without occlusions which enables automated tampering
methods to generate realistic forgeries.
2) Training Setting: The employed pipeline for this data
set is the same as for Faces-HQ data set and CelebA, but
with an additional block. Since the DeepFakeDetection data
set contains videos, we first need to extract the frame and then
crop the inner faces from them. Due to the different content
of the scenes of the videos, these cropped faces have different
sizes.
The pre-processing part from the pipeline is size
independent, thus no changes are required. However,
this is not true for the classifiers, since they expect a fixed
amount of features. Therefore, we have added an extra
processing block just before the classifier that interpolates
the 1D Power Spectrum to a fix size (300) and normalizes it
dividing it by the 0th frequency component. The rest of the
pipeline remains unchanged.
3) Method 1D Power Spectrum: As in the previous exper-
iments, Fig. 7 shows that deepfake images have a noticeably
80% (train) - 20% (test)
# samples SVM Logistic Reg.
2000 87% 81%
1000 87% 78%
200 86% 70%
20 82% 35%
TABLE VII: Test accuracy using SVM classifier and logistic
regression classifier under different data settings.
Fig. 8: 1D Power Spectrum statistics from DeepFakeDetection
data set.
different frequency characteristic. Despite of having a similar
behaviour along the spatial frequency, there is a clear offset
between the real the fakes that allows the images to be
classified.
Table VII contains the classification accuracy for the su-
pervised algorithms. These results confirm the robustness of
frequency components as classification features. Nevertheless,
in this case, we have observed a slightly different behaviour
with respect to Faces-HQ accuracy results (see Table II). The
problem is become harder for low-resolution inputs. Hence,
the accuracy starts to decrease when the number of samples
is smaller than 1000, specially, for the logistic regression.
The dependency on samples and the non-perfect classifica-
tion accuracy can be understood by looking at Fig. 8. We can
see how the standard deviations from the real and the deepfake
statistics overlap with each other, meaning that some samples
will be misclassified. As a result, it is not recommendable to
reduce the number of features, since now the classifiers are
much more sensitive to the number of features.
Finally, we compute the average classification rate per
video, applying a simple majority vote over the single frame
classifications. Table VIII shows the accuracy test results,
which are relatively higher than the previous ones based on a
frame by frame evaluation.
SVM Logistic Reg.
91% 82%
TABLE VIII: Test accuracy per video using SVM classifier
and logistic regression classifier.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we described and evaluated the efficacy of a
new method to expose AI-generated fake faces images. Our
approach is based on a high-frequency component analysis.
We performed extensive experiments to demonstrate the ro-
bustness of our pipeline independently of the source image.
We show that our method is able to detect high- and medium-
resolution deepfake images on two data sets with data from
various GANs with 100% accuracy. Low-resolution content
is harder to identify since the available frequency spectrum
is much smaller. Nevertheless, we are able to identify low-
resolution fakes in a popular benchmark with 91% accuracy.
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